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THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION TWO
OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT*
Arthur Earl Bonfieldf
I. THE PROBLEM
One of the fundamental challenges of our day is the preservation of
our civil and political liberties from the encroachments of private and
public bodies. To this end we set up civil rights commissions, enact
civil rights legislation, and otherwise attempt to enforce those rights
politically as well as in the courts.
Arguably the most fundamental of all these rights we enjoy is the
right to vote. The possession of this privilege has made us a fortunate
people in that we live under a government responsible to, and chosen
by, those whose society it orders. The protection of the franchise as it
is conceived in our framework of government should therefore be of
great concern to us all, causing us to resist with utmost vigor any diminu-
tion of this right beyond that constitutionally sanctioned. Through pres-
ervation of its integrity we insure responsible democratic government,
which, allowing for imperfections, continues to represent the people.
Various provisions in our Constitution endeavor to regulate, guarantee
and safeguard this valuable right. Most of them have been amply com-
mented on and sufficiently litigated so that their utility, both in fact
and theory, is reasonably clear. This paper will attempt to explore a
hitherto uncharted area of franchise regulation, an area based on a
guarantee by indirection.
The second section of the fourteenth amendment is one of the few
provisions of the Constitution which no one has seriously attempted to
enforce through judicial action.' It is potentially one of the most power-
ful sections of our fundamental law available to counter the wholesale
disfranchisement of many classes of our population, and stands as a
powerful inducement to the achievement of universal suffrage among
our adult citizenry.
The ease with which states are able to deny the franchise to persons
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Thomas I. Emerson of Yale Law
School for his valuable advice and interest in this project.
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 138, for biographical data.
1 This statement is not completely accurate since one attempt to enforce § 2 was made
in Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946), discussed
at length, text accompanying note 124 infra.
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on account of their race, and thus circumvent the fifteenth amendment,
has been amply demonstrated. The poll tax, literacy test, and other
similar qualifications imposed on the exercise of the franchise, seem
under present case law to be invincible in their "non-discriminatory"
format. The provision of the fourteenth amendment discussed here may
provide a remedy for this situation. It is not directed solely at the
Negro or the South, for a certain amount of disfranchisement occurs in
almost all areas of the union. It is aimed at inducing the enfranchise-
ment of all citizens over twenty-one, regardless of their race, literacy or
economic status.
This article will attempt to demonstrate how that provision would
operate to secure these objectives. After a full discussion of its history
and objectives, an attempt will be made to formulate a workable plan
whereby section 2 of the fourteenth amendment can be enforced and
its potential realized. The problems engendered by any such proposal
are, of course, numerous and complex. Each of them will, therefore, be
as thoroughly explored as space permits, and a solution ventured.
II. THE BACKGROUND
Facing the 39th Congress when it convened in 1865 after the Civil
War, was the urgent problem of insuring that the new representational
power resulting from the thirteenth amendment's abolition of slavery'
did not redound to the old southern leadership. This, the leaders of
the controlling Republican party felt, could be accomplished in either
of two ways. They could either reduce southern representation in Con-
gress to offset the projected increase from the effects of the thirteenth
amendment,3 or enfranchise the Negro who was bound, they rea-
soned, to vote for his Republican saviors.4 While the precise motives
of the individuals engaged in the drafting and adoption of section 2 of
the fourteenth amendment are difficult to define, it is fair to say on the
basis of the evidence that both these objectives were sought by the pro-
vision as finally ratified.
Early proposals basing representation in the House on legal voters5
2 The thirteenth amendment by abolishing slavery removed the class of people "all other
persons," thereby ending the 3/5 compromise of article I, section 3 (Elk v. Wilkins, 112
U.S. 94, at 101-02 (1884)), all former slaves thereafter to be counted as whole persons
for purposes of apportionment.
3 Flack, The Adoption of the 14th Amendment 98 (1908), felt that this objective was
foremost in the mind of Congress when it adopted § 2, the desire to insure the Negro's
ballot being only a secondary objective at best.
4 James, The Framing of the 14th Amendment 33 (1950), feels that this objective was
primary in the drafting of § 2, thus disagreeing with Flack, supra note 3.
5 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1865) (proposals introduced by Representa-
tives Schenck and Stevens).
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were almost immediately discarded as being politically inexpedient.'
Other measures, basing representation on population reduced by dis-
franchised Negroes,' were ultimately considered by the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction,8 which held its first meeting on January 9, 1866.
After successive amendments in committee, a final text was reported to
the House on January 31.10 Though the resolution was adopted in the
House by the required two-thirds vote necessary for a constitutional
amendment,'- it failed in the Senate.' 2 The failure of this first attempt
at a fourteenth amendment is attributable to certain deficiencies in the
proposed solution to the voting-representation problem. First, in the
minds of some, the proposed measure seemed to sanction the right of
states to disfranchise because of race and only suffer the prescribed
penalty. Second, "the radicals correctly reckoned that the dominant
race by imposing educational and property qualifications for voting, (for
which no penalty was imposed by the first measure), would disfranchise
a sufficient number of the Negroes to retain control of the South." 3 A
third reason probably contributing to its failure was the extreme penalty
of exclusion of all Negroes from the apportionment when the right to
vote of just one was denied.
Particularly noteworthy of this first attempt at solving the representa-
tional problem posed by the newly emancipated Negro, was the provision
for reduction of a state's representation solely when that state denied
or abridged the right to vote for reasons of race. This was the origin
of the substantial loophole in the law furnishing the second objection
to the scheme as initially proposed,' 4 and greatly contributed to its
ultimate defeat.' 5
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction in reconsidering a solution
to the problem, at first adopted a measure substantially identical to the
6 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141, 357 (1866) (remarks of Representative Blaine;
Representative Conkling).
7 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 134-36 (1866) (Representatives Pike and Blaine).
8 Id. at 535 (report by Representative Stevens).
9 Kendrick, The journal of the joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 37 (1914)
[hereinafter cited as Kendrick, journal].
10 Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be in-
cluded within this Union according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed: Provided, That when-
ever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race
or color, all persons therein of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of
representation.
joint Resolution 51, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866). Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 535
(1866).
11 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 538 (1866).
12 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1289 (1866).
13 Kendrick, journal 295 (1914).
14 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358, 376 (1866) (remarks of Representatives Rod-
gers & Conkling; Representative Jenckes).
15 See supra note 13.
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one that failed,' but soon displaced it in favor of a new measure 7
which was the one ultimately reported to the House18 and, with some
additions, adopted as section 2 of the fourteenth amendment. It read:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may
be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be
denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one years
of age, or in any way abridged except for participation in rebellion or
other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.' 9
Unfortunately, no report of the discussion accompanying the adoption
of this form by the Committee is available. This is especially unfortu-
nate in light of the dramatic changes and innovations embodied in this
measure.
This was the first proposal acceptable to the Committee which did
not contain the words race or color as a limitation on the types of dis-
crimination for which the penalty could be invoked. It was also the
first measure that did not exclude in counting for apportionment pur-
poses all Negroes in a state, for the deprivation of the right of suffrage
of just one on racial grounds. Two of the deficiencies of the earlier
defeated proposal were thus cured. Interestingly, section I of that
amendment, which has emerged as one of the most important provisions
of our Constitution, was added at this time almost as an afterthought, 0
present section 2 being deemed the more important contribution by its
framers~l
The report of the Committee22 indicates that the measure had a dual
purpose. First, it was directed at preventing any political advantage
from accruing to the old southern leadership by virtue of the emanci-
pation of the slaves. Second, it was aimed at insuring that "the rights
of these persons by whom the basis of representation had been increased
should be recognized by the general government." The report continues,
pointing out that the reason the reduction formula was utilized was that
the states would not consent to surrender their power over the franchise.
Hence, the choice of dealing with the problem by indirection.
16 Kendrick, Journal § 3, at 90-91.
17 Id. at 101-02.
18 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866).
39 Kendrick, Journal 102; Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866).
20 Note the complete absence of anything like section 1 in the first proposal reported
to Congress, supra note 10.
21 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459, 2510 (1866) (Representatives Stevens;
Miller).
22 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 2 Reports of Committees, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. XIII (1865-6).
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A careful reading of the Committee's official explanation of its work
indicates no particular intention to limit the imposition of the penalty
solely to cases where the basis of discrimination is "on account of race
or color." These quoted words were omitted from this new proposal
sent to Congress apparently because of the objection previously dis-
cussed-that they would enable circumvention of the congressional
purpose via imposition by the states of unpenalizable educational or
property qualifications. 23 Though the plight of the Negro was the chief
concern of the drafters of section 2, nothing in the words of the Com-
mittee report precludes the most natural interpretation of the amend-
ment, one consonant with a literal reading of its terms. That interpreta-
tion is, that all citizens over twenty-one whose franchise is denied or
abridged for any reason whatsoever, are to be protected by indirection.
Conversely, the states are to be protected against each other's political
power to the extent that that power is derived from such disfranchised
persons. The debates in Congress over the adoption of the Committee's
resolution clearly indicate that this was the intention of that body in
approving section 2 of the fourteenth amendment. They make clear
that any abridgment of the franchise of citizen-inhabitants over twenty-
one, regardless of whether it is grounded on race, education, or property,
is to be penalized2 4  The proposed amendment being adopted with
slight modifications' by the required two-thirds vote of both Houses, 26
it was ratified by three-fourths of the states to become section 2 of the
fourteenth amendment.27
Pressure for the enforcement of section 228 led to the enactment in
the second session of the 42d Congress (1871-2) of a general implement-
ing statute.29 It reads: 'o
23 See supra note 13.
24 In the House, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459, 2510, 2511, 2539-40 (1866)
(Representatives Stevens, Miller, Elliot & Farnsworth); in the Senate, id. at 3026, 3033,
2767 (Senators Cowan, Henderson, Clark & Howard); the defeat of Senator Doolittle's
amendments at 2986 and 2991 demonstrate this by negative implication.
25 Added were the words "when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
the executive, and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof."
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3038, 3041 (1866). They were added so the penalty
could not be invoked in lesser elections, i.e., school-district or justice-of-the-peace elections.
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3039 (1866) (Representative Howard). Note also the
substitution of the word "inhabitants" for "citizens" in the phrase "denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such state, . . ."
26 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (1866) (House); the House concurred in the
Senate's amendment at 3148-49, the Senate at 3042.
27 Certified as ratified on July 28, 1868, Constitution, Annotated 45 (Corwin ed. 1952).
28 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 523, 552 (1870) (Representatives Judd & Paine);
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1871) (Representative Willard).
29 17 Stat. 29 (1872), Rev. Stat. § 22 (1875), 2 U.S.C. § 6 (1958).
80 As codified into positive law by the Revised Statute of 1875, § 22, now found in
2 US.C. § 6 (1958).
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Should any State deny or abridge the right of any of the male inhabitants
thereof, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States,
to vote at any election named in the amendment to the Constitution,
article 14, section 2, except for participation in the rebellion or other crime,
the number of Representatives apportioned to such State shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall have to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Those supporting the measure clearly were convinced that it, as well
as the second section of the fourteenth amendment, would and did apply
to all abridgments and deprivations of the franchise, whether such re-
strictions arose by virtue of an educational or property qualification, or
by reason of race.3' Indeed, the amendment was probably enforced on
this basis in the apportionment of 1872,32 although no penalty was im-
posed on any state due to the insufficient numbers disfranchised (or in-
ability to find accurate figures substantial enough to impose a penalty).83
Section 2 has never been enforced since that time, though attempts
by individual Congressmen to make the apportionment of representa-
tives conform to its mandate have not been lacking.3 4 The hot political
nature of such proposals has doomed them to failure.
A few have disagreed with the idea that section 2 was intended to
apply to cases where the disfranchisement or abridgment was due to
educational or property qualifications as well as to race.35 In maintain-
31 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65, 83, 81, 35, 610 (1871) (remarks of Representa-
tives Willard, Shellabarger, Garfield & Trumbull). Note that Representatives Shellabarger
and Garfield, and many others, were also in Congress when both the second section of the
fourteenth amendment as well as the fifteenth amendment were enacted. Biographical
Directory of American Congress (1958). Compare id. at 290-98 with 318-25 and 299-308.
32 Note the concurrence of the House to the Senate's amendment to the apportionment
bill enforcing § 2, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 713 (1872), after the Senate pur-
ported to apply § 2, finding, however, that on the basis of the figures it had, no penalty
was warranted. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 617, 670 (1872) (Senators Thurman &
Morril) ; but see id. at 82-83 (1871) (Representative Garfield--"we are bound to take
this report into account," i.e., the number disfranchised).
33 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 670 (1872); also id. at 83 (1871).
34 11 Cong. Rec. 1184, 1189, 1192, 1273; 13 Cong. Rec. 1233 (1882) (Representative
Prescott); H. Rep. No. 2130, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 121-46 (1900) (Representative Crum-
packer's dissent) ; 34 Cong. Rec. 556, 600-01 (1901) (Representative Shattuc) ; id. at 67-75
(Appendix), 517, 607-09, 652 (Representatives Crumpacker, Olmstead, Lacey); 40 Cong.
Rec. 3885-94 (1906) (Representative Keifer). 60 Cong. Rec. 1682 (1921); 61 Cong. Rec.
6311-12 (1921) ; 69 Cong. Rec. 3727-32 (1928) ; 70 Cong. Rec. 1597 (1929); 71 Cong. Rec.
2271-3, 2348, 2364 (1929) (all remarks by Representative Tinkham). (See also Representa-
tive Tinkham's efforts on this matter in Hearings before the Committee on the Census
and Apportionment, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 97-115 (1920) ; id. at 28, 35, 68, for statements by
others pro-enforcement.) 103 Cong. Rec. 13461-65 (1957) (Senator McNamara); 105
Cong. Rec. 2455-56 (1959) (Senator McNamara); 106 Cong. Rec. 5749 (daily ed. March 21,
1960) (statement by Representative Bentley who had a short study of § 2 entered in
the Record.)
35 Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress 418 (1884-86); I Sherman, Recollections of Forty
Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet 450-51 (1895) (both authors in Congress when
the fourteenth amendment was passed); Maurer, "Congressional and State Control of
Elections Under the Constitution," 16 Geo. L.J. 314, 338 (1928); O'Neal, "Power of
Congress to Reduce Representation in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral
College," 181 N. Am. Rev. 530 (1905).
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ing that the penalty provided was only to be invoked where the dis-
franchisement or abridgment was directly due to the race of the deprived
party, they concluded that the fifteenth amendment repealed section 2.
Their position does not withstand analysis.3 6 In the first place, the
legislative history clearly demonstrates that the consensus of those who
enacted both section 2 and present section 6 of 2 U.S.C. (1958) was
that they are not so limited.37 It was clear to them that if the provision
were to be drawn so narrowly, it could easily be circumvented .3  This
they sought to avoid. The language of section 2 supports a far broader
construction than these dissenters contend for. Also clear is the fact
that the members of Congress who passed the fifteenth amendment did
not think, nor intend, that it should in any way effect section 2.'9 This,
since a somewhat similar Congress, 40 a year after the proclamation of
the fifteenth amendment4  enacted a statute implementing section 2 .42
The language of the fifteenth amendment43 in no way indicates or
suggests any adverse effects by it on the fourteenth.
The Supreme Court has indicated in dictum that the right to vote
intended to be protected by section 2 was the right of the franchise as
established by the laws of the several states.4 4 In this the Court would
seem clearly in error, for the legislative history demonstrates that it
was just that qualification of electors by state law that the provision
was aimed at discouraging. To be noted in this connection is the defeat
of a measure basing representation on electors qualified by state law
proposed just prior to the adoption of section 2,45 as well as the rejection
of the first proposed amendment because of the ability of states to im-
pose educational or property qualifications on the electorate without
being penalized.46 The absurdity of this position is illustrated by the
fact that if adhered to, a state restricting suffrage to whites only, before
the passage of the fifteenth amendment, would not have been acting
36 2 Willoughby, Constitution 626 (2d ed. 1929); Wise, Citizenship 232 (1906) (both
support the broader, historically more accurate, construction contended for here).
37 See notes 24 & 31 supra.
38 See notes 13 & 14 supra.
" No mention of § 2 is made in the debates in Congress on the adoption of the fifteenth
amendment. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. XVI (1869) (pages where debate on the
amendment appear are listed under Senate Joint Resolution No. 8).
40 Biographical Directory of the American Congress (1958). Compare 299-308 with
318-25. See also 290-98 for a comparison of those in Congress when § 2 was passed.
41 The fifteenth amendment was certified as ratified March 30, 1870. Constitution,
Annotated 47 (1952).
42 17 Stat. 29 (1872), 2 U.S.C. § 6 (1958).
43 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."
44 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892).
45 Cong. Globe, 3th Cong., 1st Sess. 2986, 2991 (1866) (Senator Doolittle's amendment).
46 See notes 13 & 14 supra.
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within 'the penalizable scope of the section, because, by this view, the
penalty could only be invoked when the franchise as granted by state
law was denied or abridged. Nothing could be more inconsistent with
the intentions of the framers of section 2.
This provision of our Constitution, therefore, directs in mandatory
language (unlike the permissive language of the last sections of the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments giving to Congress
power to enforce them) that whenever the right to vote of any adult
citizen-inhabitant is denied or abridged, for any reason whatsoever,
excepting only participation in rebellion or other crime, that that state's
representation shall be proportionately reduced. Congress has no dis-
cretion in the matter and no enforcing legislation seems necessary. The
fifteenth amendment in prohibiting any state from denying the fran-
chise on account of race merely added an additional penalty, that of
unconstitutionality, to that already imposed by section 2. The two
amendments and remedies provided therein are not inconsistent, the
penalty of section 2 being necessary and valuable as an alternative
remedy to disfranchisement by a state because of race. Even if this
argument fails to convince, the most that can be said is that the fifteenth
amendment repealed section 2 to the extent of withdrawing the penalty
in a case where the deprivation is based solely on race. It remains the
only remedy in cases where the disfranchisement is grounded on reasons
other than race, in which area the fifteenth amendment cannot be deemed
to have even an arguable application.
The nineteenth amendment would seem to have abrogated the word
((male" in section 2. While the original intent underlying the adoption
of section 2 was to permit the disfranchisement of females as such with-
out penalty, the addition of the nineteenth amendment to the Consti-
tution implicitly reversed that policy by declaring that the franchise
could not be denied because of one's sex.
Practically all qualifications imposed on the exercise of the franchise
constitute deprivations or abridgments within the contemplation of
section 2. The most common are the poll tax and literacy test.47 The
language of the provision would prohibit such qualifications since it uses
the words "abridge" (to diminish, lessen, curtail, reduce in compass or
to deprive)4" and "deny" (refuse to recognize or acknowledge as hav-
ing a certain claim, refuse to grant) .4 The word abridge imports depri-
47 2 Willoughby, Constitution of the U.S. 626 (2d ed. 1929) (they are abridgments);
Wise, Citizenship 232 (1906) ; 2 Watson, The Constitution of the United States 1652 (1910)
(they might be abridgments).
48 1 A New English Dictionary 33 (1888).
49 3 A New English Dictionary 201 (1888).
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vation or diminishment at a particular instant regardless of future
changes in that condition. Clearly, also, any individual able to vote by
meeting these qualifications, such as a poll tax or literacy test, has not
suffered a denial or abridgment of his franchise. 50
Prerequisites to voting based on residence within a state for specified
periods (but not within a political subdivision) might be excluded from
the scope of section 2. They may be said to operate merely as objective
determinations of whether an individual is an inhabitant of the state
for purposes of that provision, the Penalty for which, it will be re-
membered, may only be invoked where "inhabitants" of a state are dis-
franchised. This construction, however, presupposes that varying state
definitions of resident ("inhabitant") are incorporated by reference in
the federal constitutional provision. This is unsatisfactory since the
word "inhabitant" would have 50 different meanings and be subject to
state whim (e.g., a state might establish a ten-year residence require-
ment). Further, it is unlikely that the framers of section 2 intended
such a result, their purpose in inserting the word "inhabitant" being
solely to insure that no state is penalized for deprivations or abridg-
ments worked on anyone other than bona fide residents. The better
view would construe "inhabitant" as a word of art with an independent
federal meaning-a more than appropriate position for the interpretation
of a constitutional provision. All specific state periods of residence are,
as a result, denials or abridgments to the extent that they exceed federal
requirements imposed by the word "inhabitant." Inhabitancy in a state
under federal law has been determined in the context of the diversity of
citizenship provision,51 which construction is persuasive here. Those
cases have defined a citizen of a state (by virtue of section I of the
fourteenth amendment, an American citizen residing in the state) as
one who has removed himself to that state (regardless of how long he
has been there) with intent to be a bona fide resident."2 For this reason,
any specific period of residence imposed by a state as a prerequisite to
the franchise is, except as a rebuttable evidential presumption, an abridg-
ment of the franchise within the terms of section 2. However, the re-
quirement that an elector must register to cast his ballot is not an
abridgment but a technical regulation of elections, not unlike require-
50 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767 (1866) (remarks of Representatives Stewart
& Howard).
51 72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
52 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889);
Paudler v. Paudler, 185 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) ; Cooper
v. Gilbraith, 6 Fed. Cas. 472 (No. 3193) (C.C.D. Pa. 1819); Ellis v. Southeast Constr. Co.,
158 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Ark.), reversed on other grounds, 260 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1958).
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ments dictating the form of the ballot or the hours during which votes
may be cast."'
Because a requirement like the poll tax is not an abridgment under
section I of the fourteenth amendment 4 (privileges and immunities),
it does not follow that it fails to abridge the right to vote as protected
by section 2.15 Each state may impose prerequisites to the franchise56
so long as they do not conflict with the fifteenth and nineteenth amend-
ments. Yet these prerequisites still create denials or abridgments to
the extent that they inhibit the right to vote of citizens-inhabitants over
twenty-one, and are therefore within the penalizable scope of section 2.
The rejection of an amendment proposed by Senator Doolittle which
would have based the apportionment on male citizens qualified by state
law reinforces this view."
Malapportionment intrastate should also be considered an abridgment
of the franchise within the scope of this provision, since the ballot of
those electors residing in grossly overpopulated districts is worth only
a fraction of that of an elector residing in an underpopulated district.5
Dilution of the ballot being the equivalent of its abridgment,59 all adult
citizen-inhabitants tesiding in grossly overpopulated districts should be
considered in imposing the prescribed penalty. Section 2 was directed at
achieving almost universal suffrage. Such a goal by its very nature con-
templates substantial equality among the ballots of each elector, since
in the absence of such equivalence the few will control the outcome of
the election, thereby negating in fact the existence of such universal
suffrage. This is a compelling reason to apply the provision to mal-
apportionment intrastate. Such an application would advance the general
purpose of the framers, though the legislative history indicates no in-
tent to include this particular type of action within the term "abridge."
This lack of specific intent should not disturb the conclusion urged here,
for the legislature could not have been expected to forsee all the possible
53 Representative Shellabarger, who was in Congress at the time of the passage of present
§ 2, during the debates on enforcement of that provision which led to the enactment of
17 Stat. 29 (1872), 2 U.S.C. § 6 (1958), made remarks to this effect as to both residence
and registration requirements. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1871).
54 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
55 In so far as Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235, at 237 (1945), intimates otherwise, it
would seem to be in error.
56 U.S. Const. article I, § 2.
57 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2986, 2991 (1866).
58 This argument was rejected rather unconvincingly in Daly v. County of Madison,
378 Ill. 357, 365-66, 38 N.E.2d 160, 165 (1941). See note 61 for evidence of a court
inclination to construe the provision in the way suggested in the text.
59 Cases such as United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) ; United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Ex parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371 (1880), which consider dilution of the ballot, as granted by article 1, § 2, equiva-
lent to its denial or abridgment-support this conclusion.
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applications of its proposal. It is enough in considering any potential
application that the general spirit and purpose of the measure is ad-
hered to.6 And clearly the penalization of a scheme such as intrastate
malapportionment, which makes possible the virtual exclusion of whole
classes of the population from an effective franchise, is within the spirit
and purpose of the amendment no less than educational or property
qualifications. It is no objection to this equation of dilution of the ballot
resulting from such intrastate malapportionment with the abridgments
contemplated by the drafters of section 2, to suggest that it would mean
penalizing state A for abridgments perpetrated in state B, since the
ballots of the electors in A would otherwise be diluted. This argument
fails by its misapplication of the remedy which must be applied solely
to the state where the initial disfranchisement occurred, thereby correct-
ing the inequality.
Any attempt to limit the compass of the words denial or abridgment
solely to instances where citizen-inhabitants over twenty-one have actu-
ally attempted to vote, and have been rejected, should be strenuously
resisted. Such a construction would thwart the basic purpose of the
provision which was to prevent disfranchisement in fact. An attempt
to vote and subsequent rejection are merely evidence of an abridgment,
though of the most conclusive sort to be sure. The person who would
have been kept from the ballot box had he attempted to use it is no
less deprived of the franchise than the person who subjects himself to
an actual rejection. 1
Though section 1 of the fourteenth amendment requires state action
as a prerequisite to its application,' section 2, as a reading will disclose,
is seemingly unencumbered by that requirement. Though the Supreme
Court has often made the general pronouncement that the fourteenth
amendment requires state action and is not applicable to the actions of
private persons, it has referred solely to section 1.11
The legislative history may be construed as indicating the intention
of the framers to limit the penalty to cases of state action. 4 On the
60 The fourteenth amendment "is to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes
of its framers." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880). And see Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266 (1957); Missouri v. Holland, 252 US. 416, 433 (1920);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
01 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), giving support to the point of view
that legal relations can be altered in the abstract by the mere presence of a statute with-
out any necessity of an actual application in the particular case.
62 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 92 (1951) (Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent);
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). Section 1 reads: "No State shall . . . nor shall any
State .... "
63 A study of the cases in note 62, supra, partly demonstrates this.
64 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459, 2498, 2510, 2939 (1866) (remarks of Repre-
sentatives Stevens, Broomall, Miller, Hendricks).
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other hand, it can be argued that the frequent and specific references
to the state as the abridgor were due solely to the fact that its actions
were the primary, but not the only target of the legislature's efforts.
This line of reasoning is supported by the language of the section itself,
as well as the failure of an earlier proposal in committee which by its
terms would have required state action for the invocation of its penalty.65
In line with the provision's underlying purpose of inducing universal
suffrage, it would be inconsistent to limit its application to state action
since the ballot may be effectively denied by private action. Even if the
drafters intended to restrict the operation of the section to state action,
could not that specific intent be overlooked in an effort to enforce the
overriding purpose of their work? This argument gains force from the
fact that the language of the provisions does not compel the imposition
of this requirement. Section 6 of 2 U.S.C. (1958) is inconsistent with
section 2 in that its effect is limited solely to instances of state action,
thus reflecting the feeling of Congress that such action was a prerequisite
to penalization. The preferred view, however, would still be in accord
with a literal reading of the provision which does not require state action.
Assuming state action is necessary to activate section 2, acts of the
state, or its agents under color of law, would come within the compass
of such a requirement,6" whether effected by statute or unjust adminis-
tration of the law. State action should also include wholesale coercion
and intimidation by members of the community though acting in their
private capacities," despite the fact that the wrongful acts of individuals
unsupported by state action are usually merely private wrongs.68 This lat-
ter inclusion in "state action" can be grounded on the assumption that the
state by failing to prevent such coercion and intimidation tacitly ap-
proves and lends its support to such action. This assumption would not
be sound where coercion or intimidation is isolated and infrequent. In
such cases the state cannot realistically be expected to do anything more
than punish culprits after the fact. However, it easily could, and is
properly under a duty to prevent such incidents when they occur fre-
quently on a widespread systematic level.
The closest the Supreme Court ever cleaved to an equivalence of such
private action with state action was in the case of Terry v. Adams, 0
65 Kendrick, Journal § 3, at 91 (1914).
66 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 US. 278 (1913), as well as numerous
cases cited therein. More recently see Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951);
Screws v. United States 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
67 See this line of reasoning advanced by Representative Keifer in 40 Cong. Rec. 3889
(1906).
68 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883), United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876).
69 345 U.S. 461 (1953), culminating a line of cases equating state action with that of
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where it equated the actions of a private political group that controlled
the outcome of the primary with state action, in so far as that organi-
zation refused to permit the participation of Negroes in the selection
of their candidate. The equation was struck there due to the critical
position of the "Jaybird Association" in the electoral process,7 so critical
that it could be said to have acted in a quasi-public capacity by ef-
fectively controlling the conduct and outcome of the election. State
action is, therefore, the product of the activities of a private group in
so far as that organization acts as a representative of the state by
performing its functions.7' That coercion by a community which abridges
and denies the vote is state action cannot be easily denied, since the dif-
ference between regulation of the electorate by rule of a private organi-
zation and regulation by wide-scale intimidation and coercion is negli-
gible. In both instances private individuals are performing a state
function on a substantial scale.
Terry v. Adams and its predecessors,72 apart from charging a state
with responsibility for actions of groups permitted to perform its
functions, also seem to impose a duty on each state to keep the electoral
process free from illegal and unconstitutional discrimination on any
level. To the extent private coercion and intimidation is able to regulate
the composition of the electorate, the state has breached its duty and
may be deemed to have participated in the conspiracy.73
On the basis of either of these two interpretations of the Terry v.
Adams line of cases, state action can be found in wholesale community
coercion restricting the franchise. For this reason, whether state action
is or is not a requisite to the imposition of the penalty provided by sec-
tion 2 would not seem to be of crucial importance.
Two last preliminary points should be understood. First, a penalized
state also suffers a reduction in its electoral votes. This follows from
article II, section 2, granting each state "a number of electors equal to
the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the state
may be entitled in the Congress." Second, the penalty imposed by sec-
tion 2 and 2 U.S.C. section 6 (1958) is capable of imposition or amelio-
ration at any time between, as well as during decennial apportionments.
Further support for this can be gleaned from the language of the original
private groups regulating the electoral process: Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
70 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. at 469 (1953).
71 See cases cited note 69 supra.
72 See note 69 supra.
73 Cases like Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943); and Lynch v.
United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951), where state action
has been found in the refusal of police officials to protect persons against mob violence,
appear to support this view.
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statute of 1872 before its codification. 74 Its language even more clearly
contemplated the possibility of a reduction, if warranted, between ap-
portionments. In terms of the intention of the framers, this is the only
possible construction available, since they could not reasonably have
intended the section to be effective only every ten years, thereby en-
abling the states to circumvent its mandate between times.
Though the penalty can be increased or ameliorated between de-
cennial apportionments, the judiciary is incapable of imposing any such
change before the next election. This, since all present representatives
are seated de jure, the House being the sole judge of its members by
virtue of article I, section 5. Congress could, of course, impose the
penalty to take effect at any time, even in the midst of a session. It
might do this on its own initiative or under the compulsion of moral
force furnished by a judicial decision, knowing full well that at the
next biennial election the Court's mandate would take effect anyway.
All this rests on the basic proposition inherent in section 2 that the
penalty invoked only reduces the representation of the culprit state, no
corresponding increase occuring in the apportionment of any other state.
The lost seats are held in abeyance pending such time as they can
properly be reinstated.
With this as background, an attempt will be made to formulate a
scheme for the judicial enforcement of section 2.
III. THE PLAN
Assuming legislative enforcement of section 2 is politically impos-
sible, " a plan invoking the aid of the judiciary to attain this end would
seem to promise most success. The present apportionment statute is
as follows:
(a) On the first day or within one week thereafter, of the first regular
session of the Eighty-second Congress and of each fifth Congress there-
after, the President shall transmit to the Congress a statement showing
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed,
as ascertained under the seventeenth and each subsequent decennial
census of the population, and the number of Representatives to which each
State would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing
number of Representatives by the method known as the method of equal
proportions, no State to receive less than one Member.
(b) Each State shall be entitled, in the Eighty-third Congress and in
each Congress thereafter until the taking effect of a reapportionment under
74 17 Stat. 29 (1872), as codified and amended, Rev. Stat. § 22 (1875), 2 U.S.C. § 6
(1958).
75 See the frequent futile attempts to do so set out in note 34 supra. Note the availability
of the filibuster in the Senate as well as the control of key committees in the House by
Southern Representatives owing to their greater tenure.
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this section or subsequent statute, to the number of Representatives shown
in the statement required by subsection (a) of this section, no State to
receive less than one Member. It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the
House of Representatives, within fifteen calendar days after the receipt
of such statement, to send to the executive of each State a certificate of the
number of Representatives to which such State is entitled under this
section .... 76
This statute is clearly unconstitutional as being in conflict with sec-
tion 2 of the fourteenth amendment. It contemplates and perpetuates
an apportionment based solely on population, no account being taken
of those disfranchised in each state. This is indicated by the language
of section (b) which maintains that each state shall be entitled to the
number of representatives indicated by section (a) which bases the
apportionment on population alone. True, a state "would be entitled"
to the number of representatives due it on the basis of population alone,
but it properly "shall be entitled" only to that number minus the penalty
imposed by section 2. Therefore, a state is not always entitled to the
apportionment to which it would be entitled. As a study of the legisla-
tive history of this statute will corroborate, 77 it was intended to ground
the apportionment solely on population regardless of the extent to
which citizen-inhabitants over twenty-one in each state were disfran-
chised. The duty imposed on the Clerk is purely ministerial, and there-
fore the statute cannot be construed, to avoid unconstitutionality, 78 as
giving him the power to impose the penalty. The present apportionment
statute, and any apportionment effected thereunder, in so far as it is
not in conformity with the mandate of section 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, is thus unconstitutional.
A suit attempting to enjoin the President from the performance of his
duty is untenable, 79 though it is not as clear that such a suit would be
unsuccessful if the chief executive were acting beyond his authority
(i.e., under an unconstitutional statute). Since no precedent exists for
the successful prosecution of an action against the President, any such
alternative will be ignored. The more feasible plan would be a suit,
by specified plaintiffs, commenced in the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia ° against the Clerk of the House of Representa-
tives.8" Plaintiffs would request a declaratory judgment, pursuant to
76 55 Stat. 761-62 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1958).
77 71 Cong. Rec. 2271-73, 2348, 2364 (1929) (debates on the adoption of the apportion-
ment statute). Representatives Tinkham's efforts to amend the apportionment statute to
conform with § 2 failed, as demonstrated by the statute finally adopted. 46 Stat. 26 (1931),
2 U.S.C. § 2a (1958).
78 Statutes are to be construed to avoid constitutional objections. United States v.
CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1948).
79 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
80 The court would have jurisdiction under 11 D.C. Code Ann. § 306 (1951).
81 Some precedent exists for such a suit in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881),
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28 U.S.C. section 2201 (1958), adjudging the act unconstitutional in
so far as it fails to conform with the requirements of section 2, and an
injunction enjoining the Clerk from the performance, of his ministerial
duty under that statute insofar as it requires him to certify to any state
more representatives than it is properly entitled. A three-judge district
court would be required,8 2 with direct appeal to the Supreme Court,,3
unless the statute is construed to be constitutional. In that case, only
the action taken under it would be attacked, and such a three-man
court would be unnecessary. The suit is clearly not barred by sovereign
immunity.s4 The injunction or temporary restraining order must be
timed to prevent the Clerk's certification of the improper figures to the
several states. This should present no problem since the numbers to be
tendered to Congress by the President are ordinarily available with
indisputable accuracy substantially in advance of any such actual tender
during the first week of Congress. 5
A procedure that could be utilized to test the constitutionality of the
present apportionment, (as opposed to the next apportionment to be
certified to the states as brought into issue by the suit against the Clerk),
would be as follows. Suit could be instituted under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 (1958) in a Federal District Court in any state where a penalty
under section 2 is warranted against the local board of elections.88 The
action would be grounded on the theory that that body, by enforcing
state statutes restricting the elector to casting his ballot solely for the
contested congressional seat for the district wherein he resides, was
depriving him of one of the privileges and immunities secured to him
by the Constitution. This, since the state was not entitled to all of its
present representation, and having more electoral districts than Con-
gressmen properly apportioned it, all its representatives must be elected
at large. 7 The board of elections, in acting pursuant to state law and
restricting plaintiff-elector to balloting solely for one Congressional seat,
thereby deprives him of his rights under article I, section 2 and section 4
of the Constitution and 2 U.S.C. section 2A (1958), enacted pursuant
where the Sergeant At Arms of the House, acting in a purely ministerial capacity, as does
the Clerk here, was said not to be shielded in an action against him for false imprisonment
by an unconstitutional House order.
82 62 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958).
83 62 Stat. 928 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
84 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 27.03 (1958). See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1881).85 Even if not so available they can be calculated with indisputible accuracy since the
President's role in the calculation of the apportionment from the census figures is non-
discretionary and therefore dearly predictable.88 Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). This is the same approach taken
in Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945) (to be discussed infra, text accompany-
ing note 124).87 55 Stat. 762 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (1958).
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thereto.88 The board may, as a result, be enjoined to insure its acting
in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States. A
three-judge district court is required89 with direct appeal to the Su-
preme Court,90 since the injunction will probably be directed at restrain-
ing the enforcement of a state statute as unconstitutional.
In assessing the comparative merits of the two plans here outlined,
it readily becomes apparent that the first is preferable. The suit attempt-
ing to restrain the Clerk from certifying an improper apportionment to
certain states could settle the propriety of the apportionment to each
state of the Union at one and the same time. The second method here
outlined would require a separate suit in each malapportioned state.
That method is, of course, the only one available between apportion-
ments since it, unlike the suit against the Clerk, tests the validity of
the present apportionment. The preferable procedure would, therefore,
seem to be an action directed at the Clerk to insure a proper initial
apportionment, and suits under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (1958), to be
instituted during interim periods to effect new or further reductions of
representation in each state when warranted. The solutions and ration-
alizations of the various problems to be discussed in this paper must,
as a result, be deemed to apply to both procedures unless otherwise
specified.
The two parties in the strongest positions to challenge the unconsti-
tutionality of the new apportionment to be certified by the Clerk are
probably, first, a citizen-voter of a state that would suffer no penalty
by an enforcement of section 2, and, second, such a state itself.91 Though
it might be desirable to have those disfranchised test the statute on the
theory that they have a "right" not to be represented when they are
deprived of the ballot, the law of standing would probably make their
ability to do so more speculative than the first parties suggested. For
this reason attention here will be directed to a citizen-voter of a non-
penalizable state and to such a state itself as the potential litigants.
It is not difficult to demonstrate that both those parties are directly
88 The right to vote for federal officers, though subject to certain restrictions imposed
by the state, is derived from the Constitution, article I, §§ 2 and 4, as modified by federal
statute (here 55 Stat. 762 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (1958); and see United States v.
Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, at 661-62 (1944); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941); Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64
(1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)) and is, therefore, one of the privileges
and immunities protected by § I of the fourteenth amendment against state interference.
89 62 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958).
90 62 Stat. 928 (1948), 28 US.C. § 1253 (1958).
91 Note that with a state as plaintiff, under 62 Stat. 927 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (3)
(1958), this suit may also be brought in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction if the
Clerk is a citizen of another state.
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injured9 2 by disregard of the mandate imposed by section 2 and 2 U.S.C.
section 6 (1958).13 Because of the failure to impose the prescribed
penalty, the ballot of a voter in a state where suffrage is relatively uni-
versal is of far less weight than that of an elector in an unpenalized, dis-
franchising state. In the "universal-suffrage state" (i.e., a state where
no penalty is warranted), 1,000,000 qualified voters may elect six
representatives. In such a state almost all citizen-inhabitants over twen-
ty-one are competent to cast a ballot. An abridging state is also entitled
to six representatives on the basis of its population. If it abridges the
franchise of such persons to the extent of 50 per cent, it thereby endows
those who are qualified to vote in that state with a ballot twice as,
potent as that of the elector in our universal-suffrage state. Enforcement
of section 2, by reducing the representation of this state by 3 would
remedy this inequality. Disregard of that provision thereby works a
direct injury to the integrity of the ballot of all voters in universal-
suffrage states, depriving them in an unlawful manner of a fully effective
ballot. The direct injury to the universal-suffrage state by the failure
to conform the apportionment of other states to the requirements im-
posed by section 2 is also demonstrated by the previous illustration.
Disregard of the constitutional mandate has disabled that state from
exercising twice as many votes in the House as its unpenalized counter-
part, which disability may be expressed by saying that it has suffered a
relative loss in representation.
The legal rights 4 of the individual elector that are infringed by an
unconstitutional apportionment are varied. First, there is a naked claim
of injury to the right conferred by section 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment and by 2 U.S.C. section 6 (1958). The assertion of such a direct
legal right flowing from these general provisions would seem no less
92 Voters have standing where, though a large group, they are a divisible class sufficiently
affected by a direct and immediate injury which is not too speculative and remote, and
where the action complained of injures their legal interests. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1
(1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932);
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (all alleged
themselves electors and tax-payer citizens except Koenig-just citizen-voter-and Wood-
voter and potential candidate). For a general rationale of standing in federal courts, see
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149-58 (1951), and cases cited therein, as well as in Hart &
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 156-92 (1953). The Supreme Court
never really questioned the standing of the plaintiffs in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946), where an unsuccessful attempt was made to have the Illinois apportionment statute
declared unconstitutional. This is born out by an analysis of the cases cited after the
questionable comment at 552 (i.e., that injury was only to Illinois as a polity).
93 17 Stat. 29 (1872), as codified and amended, Rev. Stat. § 22 (1875), 2 U.S.C. § 6
(1958).
94 There must be an injury to a legal right. joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.). Standing
may be based on a legal interest created by the Constitution or a statute. Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946) ; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See also note 92 supra.
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tenable than the numerous successful attacks prosecuted by individual
tax payers on statutes violating the general directive of article I, sec-
tion 3, clause 3, commanding that direct taxes be apportioned among the
several states."5
Second, the individual has a claim of legal injury in that the apportion-
ment, by allegedly failing to conform with the requirements of section 2,
deprives him of the right of the franchise as contemplated by article I,
section 2, of the Constitution. The right to vote for federal representa-
tives is not only established by that provision but will be protected by
the courtsf6  That right (subject, of course, to state qualifications) by
implication and by its very essence contemplates substantial equality
among electors . 7 Disregard of section 2 and the statute of 1872, as
previously demonstrated, destroys this substantial equivalence. Plaintiffs
are thereby being deprived of their right to vote as guaranteed by
article I, section 2, and 2 U.S.C. section 6 (1958), by the present ap-
portionment and the new apportionment to be certified by the Clerk.
Third, dilution of the ballot being substantially the equivalent of its
deprivation, the action of the Clerk under the statute here complained
of may be considered as a deprivation of liberty or property under the
fifth amendment, since it is effected without due process.9 8 It is a dep-
rivation of property to the extent that the right of suffrage may be
analogized to such,99 and of liberty since that term certainly embraces
political rights such as the franchise. 10 These, then, are the various
legal rights impinged upon if the present or projected apportionment,
or apportionment statute, is unconstitutional, thereby supplying the
requisite legal injury necessary for standing in a case challenging their
validity. The rights of the plaintiff state to challenge such action will,
95 See Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
96 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62 (1944); United States, v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 314 (1941) ; Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884).
97 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (ballots must be honestly counted);
United Staes v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)
(article I, § 2, protects voter against the diluting effect of stuffed ballot boxes).
98 Action under a void statute is, of course, not due process. A. L. A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
!9 That it can be so analogized, see Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional
Law 263 (2d ed. 1891), and see words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536, 540 (1927), to the effect that, objection to a suit on the basis that the right asserted
by an individual is political as opposed to a property right "is little more than a play upon
words." See also cases cited in 20 C.J. Elections § 13, n.35; 29 C.J.S. Elections § 2, n.11;
and 20 C.J. Elections § 13, n.36; 29 C.J.S. Elections § 2 n.12 (right of suffrage is a vested
or property right in the sense that once conferred it cannot be taken away except by due
process).
100 Note that the term liberty as found in the fifth amendment is not qualified by any
words such as civil, political or personal. See definition of liberty as "a franchise or
personal privilege, being some part of the sovereign power, vested in an individual either
by grant or prescription." Black, Law Dictionary 1065 (4th ed. 1957). See as well Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
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of course, rest directly on section 2 itself.1°1 Clearly the plaintiffs are
in the class sought to be protected by section 2 from the tyranny of those
in disfranchising states, since by implication the protection of voters in
universal-suffrage states, as well as the states themselves as political
entities, was a prime consideration of the drafters.1 12 There being no
question that the impending action of the Clerk is final and the injury
wrought by his action sufficiently direct, the standing of the parties
would seem to be established.
A case or controversy would seem to exist in the proposed suit. 03 The
litigants are adverse since plaintiff would be attempting to enjoin the
Clerk or board of elections from the performance of their statutory duty.
The court's decree will be final, i.e., not subject to revision by the Presi-
dent or Congress. 04
One of the most formidable objections that can be raised to this suit
is that it presents a non-justiciable controversy, i.e., a political question,
and is therefore beyond the pale of judicial cognizance. The logic of
this argument, though appealing to some,' 5 must be rejected. The
present case does not fit into that class of cases deemed political because
the decision involved is relegated by the Constitution to the legislative
or executive branch of the government.0 6 Under article I, section 1,
the actual enactment or non-enactment of an apportionment statute
rests exclusively with Congress, the propriety of such action therefore
being a political question. After the passage of such a statute, however,
an attack on its validity, or action taken under it, presents a justiciable
controversy, for nowhere in the Constitution are apportionment statutes
expressly or impliedly accorded any different treatment than other legis-
lation. Such an enactment is, as a result, not removed from the scrutiny
of the Courts, and to the extent it conflicts with the non-discretionary
and absolute mandate imposed by section 2 it must fail. This case is
distinguishable from one where the validity of a Senator's election and
101 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, at 462-63 (1931), is demonstrative of the prop-
osition that a state may contest the validity of a federal act if a direct interest of a state
is shown.
102 One of the requirements often enunciated as a requisite for standing. Lee v. New
Jersey, 207 U.S. 67 (1907).
103 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357-62 (1911).
104 Though it can be argued that the House, as sole judge of its members under article I,
§ 5, could disregard any decision of the court and seat any number of Representatives it
pleases, a certain amount of good faith must always be presumed or Congress in a variety
of devious ways could almost always circumvent or nullify decisions of the court.
105 Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946),
32 Va. L. Rev. 647 (1946), discussed infra, text accompanying note 124.106 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); U.S. Const. § 1 of articles
I, IT, HI (concept of separation of power); Post, The Supreme Court and Political Ques-
tions (1936); Field, "Doctrine of Political Question in the Federal Courts," 8 Minn. L. Rev.
485 (1924). See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-56 (1939).
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the Senate's right to seat him is brought into question. Since article I,
section 5, endows Congress, and Congress alone, with the power to judge
its members, such a suit would be non-justiciable.117 Congress, however,
has no where been made the final judge of the validity of its own ap-
portionment, which apportionment rests on an enactment of its own
making.
The present case does not fit into that category of questions deemed
non-justiciable due to a lack of standards without which a court is unable
to act."08 The clarity of the language of section 2 of the fourteenth
amendment, and 2 U.S.C. section 6 (1958), especially when contrasted
with judicially enforceable phrases like "due process" or "privileges and
immunities" in the first section of the amendment, would seem to mili-
tate strongly in favor of their similar treatment. Certainly the words
"any ... denied ... abridged . . ." are not so vague as to defy judicial
action.
Nor can this case be deemed political because the question to be re-
solved is one that must be left to the electorate at the polls. 09 Such a
decision would require rules for its making, and the very question here
under consideration is what those rules are, i.e., who should get how
many representatives or votes. This argument also fails by analogy to
the separation of powers rationale previously discussed. That is, the
Constitution nowhere relegates the enforcement of this provision to the
electorate rather than the judiciary. Furthermore, nothing in that in-
strument indicates that a majority at the polls should be able to ef-
fectively destroy a provision of the Constitution which required three-
quarters of the states to bring it into being and would require a similar
number to repeal.
Though the three explanations just alluded to have been most often
cited as the reasons for finding a political question, other reasons, also
inapplicable here, have been equally important. The possibility of dras-
tic consequences resulting from. the court's decision may induce it to
rely on the smokescreen of "political question.""'  Such could not
reasonably be said to be the case here since the unconstitutionality of
the present or future apportionment would only become effective at the
next election subsequent to the court's decree. This, since all present
members of Congress are seated de jure, that bodk being the sole judge
107 Barry v. United States, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1929).
Los Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-56 (i939). See also Saunders v. Wilkins, supra
note 105.
-09 See Mr. Justice Woodbury, dissenting in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 51
(1849).
110 Id. at 37-39. The possible consequences of holding unconstitutional the entire govern-
ment of a state seemingly induced the court to denominate the issue nonjusticiable.
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of its membership under article I, section 5. Congress' failure to correct
the situation seems irrelevant, for such a failure would be indistinguish-
able from the possibility of its neglect to pass an apportionment statute
after the prior one expired by its own terms. So also the court should
not denominate the issue here presented as non-justiciable due to an
inability to enforce its decree,"' since it can enjoin the operation of the
apportionment statute, or state election statute, until such time as a con-
stitutional one is enacted. The same argument can be leveled at the
objection that Congress could thwart the court's decree by failure to
enact a new statute. The suits can be timed to avoid any possible
objection on the basis of the proximity to elections of the relief if
granted," 2 thus obviating the possible inability of the legislatures to
act soon enough to avoid disruption of the forthcoming election. Indeed,
this can only be the case in the suit against the Clerk, since the new
apportionment is certified to the several states within one week and
fifteen days of the start of every fifth session of Congress, such new
apportionment to be effective two years later at the next session." 3
All these points militate in favor of the assumption by the judiciary
of the responsibility for the enforcement of section 2, when such a case
is presented. Certainly the fact that the rights sought to be vindicated
are political," 4 or are embroiled in politics," 5 will not deter the court,
for such considerations are not to be confused with that which is de-
nominated "political question." In this connection it should also be noted
that since the passage of the perpetual and automatic reapportionment
act,1 6 interstate apportionment has assumed a non-political character,
having become merely an administrative task.
The only hope for plaintiffs in terms of the vindication of their rights
lies with the judiciary, for the legislature has been deaf to their pleas
and negligent in its duty for a hundred years. Though subject to criti-
cism, the argument must be made that failure to check this legislative
encroachment on our fundamental law will lead to greater ones, and
thus leave unprotected an unchecked power in that body capable of
destroying our form of government. Thus, as Judge Elliot in the case of
111 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 300-01 (1867) (inability to enjoin
the President in the performance of his duty). See note 104 supra.
112 This seems to have been in the mind of some of the Justices in Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 565 (1946) (concurring opinion by Rutledge, J.).
"13 55 Stat. 761 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1958).
114 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); and Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (all cases upholding the right of
Negroes to vote in federal elections).
1'5 The issue in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was certainly one
embroiled in politics as were those involved in the cases in note 114 supra.
116 55 Stat. 761 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1958).
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Parker v. State117 said in reference to apportionment questions brought
before his court,
To me it seems that the duty is, if possible, higher and sterner in such
cases than in any others, for if unconstitutional apportionment acts are
conceded to be beyond the domain of the judiciary, then . .. a legislative
body would be at full and unrestrained liberty to enact measures per-
petuating its own existence and augmenting its own power. .... An ap-
portionment act which violates the provisions of the Constitution can no
more become a law than can an unconstitutional act upon any other sub-
ject, nor has it any peculiar virtue or sanctity that lifts it above the power
of the judiciary.118
This is especially so when the malapportionment is interstate as here,
rather than intrastate, since such a malapportionment affects the very
foundations and framework of the federal system. The very essence of
the relationship between the several states, one to another, and between
the several branches of the government, would be altered by the courts
denomination of this issue as political.
Cases denominating intrastate malapportionment as a non-justiciable
issue" 9 are inappropriate precedents to the present suit. First, the consti-
tutional provision governing intrastate apportionment" ° may be inter-
preted as conferring on Congress exclusive authority to secure fair
representation by the states in the popular House, leaving to it alone
the determination whether the states have fulfilled their responsibility
internally.12 1 Apportionment interstate is governed by entirely different
provisions, section 2 of the fourteenth amendment, and article I, sec-
tion 2. Unlike article I, section 4, governing the conduct of elections,
hence intrastate apportionment, no one is named as a supervisory or
enforcement agency. Therefore, there is no reason to conclude otherwise
than that laws enacted pursuant to section 2 are subject to judicial
supervision in the same manner as any other. This is a prime distinction
117 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836 (1892).
118 Id. at 210-11, 32 N.E. at 846.
19 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), where the issue as to justiciability was
actually decided favorable 4-3. The issue's justiciability may also have been dictum even
as to the decision of the majority opinion of three. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950),
seems, however, to indicate possible acceptance of the political rationale. The Colegrove
case is criticized, Notes, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 296 (1947); 41 IMI. L. Rev. 578 (1946); 45 Mich.
L. Rev. 368 (1947); 25 Texas L. Rev. 419 (1947); 56 Yale L. J. 127 (1946). In general
on this problem of apportionment intrastate, see Lewis, "Legislative Apportionment and
the Federal Courts," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1958).
120 Article I, § 4:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding elections . . . Representatives shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such regulations.
justice Frankfurter is of that view in Colegrove supra note 119, at 554.
121 Rather than concede this to be the case, the author would prefer to think that the
Colgrove case did not irrevocably settle the question of the justiciability of the issue of
intrastate apportionment presented there, or if it did, it will in the future be limited to
its "precise facts."
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to be observed between the hypothetical case under consideration deal-
ing with interstate apportionment, and cases dealing with intrastate
apportionment.
A further distinction between this case and Colegrove v. Green, 2 the
principal case denominating intrastate apportionment a political ques-
tion, is the presence here of a statute, 2 U.S.C. section 6 (1958), which
purports to implement section 2. Such an expression of congressional
will was absent to the facts in Colegrove.123 Therefore, either if the
issue of interstate apportionment is erroneously deemed controlled by
an unfavorable view of that case, or as a political question as an in-
dependent proposition, the enactment of the statute of 1872 should
render it justiciable. Congress through the formulation and enactment
of legislation has given notice of its "political" decision, and having
made that requisite policy formulation on a matter beyond judicial com-
petence, invites and authorizes the court's intervention in favor of its
enforcement. A refusal by the court to enforce the congressional man-
date would be, in effect, hindering the supposed constitutional principle
that Congress shall be supreme in the matter of apportionment, since
without the aid of the judiciary the congressional will would be thwarted.
For this reason the denomination of the issue presented here as non-
justiciable cannot reasonably be supported from any vantage point.
A further distinction should be noted where interstate apportionment
questions are involved. The judicial failure to enforce proper interstate
apportionment might completely alter the nature of the federal system
and the balance between the states, while intrastate malapportionment
is limited in scope to each particular state. Obviously, as regards the
individual voter, the effectiveness of his ballot may be diminished by
abuse in either situation. However, if we proceed on the perhaps out-
moded notion that the protection of the rights of the sovereign states
were, in the minds of the framers of the Constitution, the most important
ones to be protected, it might be concluded that judicial abstention in
this case is far more dangerous than in the Colegrove-type situation.
For that reason the court might deem it more important to intercede
here than it did in that case. Of course, this extreme view need only be
presented if that decision is erroneously accepted as authoritative in
this situation.
A more direct discussion of the justiciability of section 2 was furnished
122 See note 119 supra.
123 Note the Court's citation, 328 U.S. at 551, of Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932),
which held that the statute requiring substantially equal election districts had lapsed, thus
lending credence to the view that the Court might have entertained the case had the
statute there involved still been in force.
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by the case of Saunders v. Wilkins.' 24 There an action was brought
against the Secretary of State of Virginia to recover damages, under
what is now 28 U.S.C. section 1983 (1958), for his failure to certify
the plaintiff as a candidate for election as a Representative-at-large in
the House. His contention was that through the poll tax imposed by
Virginia, 60 per cent of her United States citizen-inhabitants over twenty-
one were deprived of their franchise, for which reason, pursuant to sec-
tion 2, the representation of Virginia should be reduced from nine to
four, the remaining four to be elected at large.'25 The court of appeals,
in upholding the district court, dismissed the suit, declaring the issue
presented under section 2 non-justiciable. The Supreme Court refused
to hear the case on certiorari, which refusal, of course, imports no ex-
pression of opinion on the merits.'26 This case would seem erroneously
decided.
The circuit court insisted that a Nebraska case, State v. Boyd, 127
where the issue was the effective date of the federal apportionment act,12 8
could not be distinguished in principle from Saunders since both dealt
with the constitutionality of federal apportionment.'9 But the Consti-
tution is silent as to the effective date of an apportionment act, Congress
thereby being given discretion, while as to the issue presented in
Saunders it is specific and mandatory. That case is, therefore, poor
precedent. The two other cases cited by the circuit court in support of
its conclusion also seems to be inappropriate precedents to establish the
non-justiciability of the issue. Luther v. Borden8° is readily distinguish-
able due to the staggering consequences inherent in holding an entire
state's government a nullity' 3 ' for not being "Republican" under arti-
cle IV, section 4, as well as the possible measure of congressional dis-
cretion granted in that situation by the indefiniteness of the standard.
And Coleman v. Miller"2 would similarly seem inapplicable owing to
the wide discretion accorded Congress under article V with regard to
the ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. Nowhere in
article V is there any direction as to how long the states shall have to
ratify, or whether a rejection of an amendment by a state makes it
impossible for it to later reverse itself (the issues in Coleman deemed
political). Thus, Congress may properly be deemed to have wide and
124 See note 105 supra.
125 In accordance with 55 Stat. 762 (1941), now 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (5) (1958).
126 House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945).
127 36 Neb. 181, 54 N.W. 252 (1893).
128 Id. at 188-89, 54 N.W. at 254.
129 Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1945).
130 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
131 Id. at 37-39.
132 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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exclusive discretion in this regard which should not be interfered with
by the judiciary.133
The Saunders case should; as a result, be regarded as erroneous in
so far as its decision rested on the non-justiciability of the issue pre-
sented. Indeed the whole doctrine of "political question" would seem,
for the reasons outlined, totally inappropriate to the present case. The
courts should both as a matter of good social policy and in order to be
consistent with their past history, function, and judicial theory, entertain
such a suit as here contemplated on the merits. This seems especially
so when it is realized that both the statute and the administrative action
in issue here work an injury to the fundamental framework and basic
operation of the democratic process itself.
Though perhaps once in doubt,1' 4 equity has jurisdiction to enjoin
the Clerk of the House from certifying to any state an incorrect number
of representatives, or indirectly to force the local board of elections to
hold elections at large. 135 The injunctions sought in this case could be
combined with, or based on, a suit for declaratory judgment declaring
the questioned action void. The exercise of equity power would clearly
be warranted by the inadequacy of pecuniary damages to remedy the
wrong suffered, the inability of plaintiffs to obtain relief elsewhere (i.e.,
from Congress), and the crucial importance of the preservation of the
rights here asserted to the future of democratic government. This being
so, there would seem no bar in the present case to the granting of the
remedy sought.
Of course, if the extent of disfranchisement cannot be demonstrated
to the satisfaction of the court, this whole scheme must fail, for such
proof is crucial both on the issue of the presence of the requisite injury,
and on the ability of the court to rationally insure its cure. In the first
instance, all that need be proven is that as to each state, where the board
of elections is sought to be enjoined, or as to whom the Clerk's certi-
fication is sought to be enjoined, it has or will have one more representa-
tive than it is entitled to. This quantum of proof is all that need be
133 Note the recent practice of Congress in specifying time limits on the ratification of
all recent amendments, U.S. Const. amends. XX-XXII.
134 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (equity will not meddle with political rights).
For a more recent state court pronouncement on this in relation to § 2, see Daly v. County
of Madison, 378 111. 357, 364-65, 38 N.E.2d 160, 164-65 (1941).
135 Equity will enforce political rights. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948);
Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); and especially
Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867), which might be construed as indicating
contra where a state is involved, should more properly be viewed as denying such relief to
a state solely when a non-justiciable issue is involved. This position is reinforced by the
Court's citation of the Georgia case in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923),
as a case involving a political question.
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presented in each of the repeated and successive injunction actions neces-
sary to insure the apportionment's conformity with section 2.
The most difficult problem in proving the extent of section 2 dis-
franchisement in any state is that of isolating the truly apathetic from
the disfranchised. From the number of citizens over twenty-one in
each state,136 we can subtract the number actually casting a ballot,' 7
thereby arriving at a figure roughly approximating the number of citi-
zens failing to vote in that state. The reasons for their failure to vote
are numerous, running the gamut from those penalizable by section 2,
to illness, or sheer apathy, unaffected by community coercion. The
problem is to separate out in some rational fashion those whose ballot
is denied or abridged within the meaning of section 2 from those failing
to exercise their franchise for other reasons. It should be noted in this
connection that though various studies have been undertaken of voting
behaviour, none of them distinguishes with any accuracy, on a state
by state basis, between those disfranchised by poll taxes, literacy tests,
community coercion, maladministration of the state's election laws, and
those failing to vote for other reasons. 18
A tentative though perhaps not completely satisfactory solution to
this problem may be suggested. A comparison between the percentage of
citizens over twenty-one casting a ballot in each state, and the national
percentage of such citizens voting, is very revealing. 8 9 We can ration-
ally conclude that to the extent the percentage not voting in any state
exceeds by more than a reasonable number of percentage points (say
10 per cent) the national average, the right to vote in that state is
denied or abridged. Though this conclusion is obviously subject to a
variety of objections, its logic is appealing when we remember that
denials or abridgments contemplated by section 2 include community
coercion as well as poll taxes, literacy tests, residence requirements,
and maladministration of the law. It presumes a fairly constant per-
136 These figures are available, see Appendix II.
137 See Appendix II infra.
138 American Heritage Foundation Report on the Presidential Election of 1956, as
reported in the N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1956, § 1, p. 24, col. 1 (unable to calculate num-
bers disfranchised by poll tax and community coercion). As to the inconclusiveness of
the estimates of the actual effect of the poll tax alone as a disfranchising device, see 1
Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 169-70 (1958). See also
Comparison of Potential Voters and Actual Votes Cast by Counties in Each State 1948-50,
S. Doc. No. 150, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), comparing total population over 21 (not only
citizens) with the vote cast in each county. On disfranchisement generally see Report
of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 19-147 (1959).
139 See Appendix II infra. Survey and census figures are generally admissable in evidence.
Wigmore, Evidence 1671, 2578 (3d ed. 1940); Zeisel, "The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence,"
45 Cornell L.Q. 324 (1960). The higher of primary or election statistics should of course
be used. This might be significant in those states with a one-party system where the
primary is more important than the election.
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centage of adult citizens in each state who do not cast a ballot for
reasons excepted from penalization by section 2 (i.e., bad weather, ill-
ness, apathy, etc.). The possible defects in this presumption are sought
to be cured by the introduction of a tolerance percentage of 10 per cent
between the national average and the individual states.140 This, then,
is a possible, though perhaps inconclusive, solution to this most critical
problem of proof. It is one that will require careful future consideration
along with others as they reveal themselves.
Obviously on a minimal plane, actual rejections at the polls of the
various states may be used as a measure of disfranchisement. Their
great deficiency comes from the inability to obtain them,'4 ' as well as
their failure to reveal the bulk of the disfranchised who never attempt
to vote due to a knowledge of the futility of such action in light of their
qualifications, community coercion, or maladministration of the law.
However, sufficient determination on the part of those disfranchised
might lead to a drastic rise in these figures with the realization of the
utility of their attempts.142
If it is concluded, as it is here contended, that intrastate malappor-
tionment constitutes an abridgment of the franchise within the scope
of section 2, then proof will also be required on that issue. Such proof
may be easily obtained by tabulating the number of citizen-inhabitants
over twenty-one residing in every malapportioned congressional dis-
trict,'143 in the state. Adjustments will, of course, be necessary to insure
that no person is counted twice, once as an abridgee due to malapportion-
ment intrastate, and once for disfranchisement grounded on literacy
tests, poll taxes, community coercion, or the like.
The problem of proof should not pose an obstacle to the enforcement
of section 2. This optimistic position seems warranted though the writer
is aware of the numerous thorny problems inherent in a completely
satisfactory solution. All factors considered, however, the solution to
140 When one considers that the national average includes in its computation the low as
well as the high, the low thereby initially pulling downward that figure, a 10% figure seems
more than reasonable. Indeed, for this reason there may be justification in using the base
figure without the 10% differential. A comparison of the modal group with each state may
also be persuasive. Is it surprising that the utilization of any of these formulas reveals
just those states as the worst culprits that one might have supposed on the basis of all the
other evidence available? See Appendix II infra, and the Civil Rights Report, supra
note 138.
141 Now more easily available under the new Civil Rights Law, 74 Stat. 88 (1960), which
incidentally, as is obvious, in no way affects the relative efficacy or necessity of the scheme
here outlined.
142 The use of expert witnesses as a method of proof is rejected as impracticable because
of the ease with which either party can produce a bevy of witnesses to bolster their point
of view.
143 I.e., a district whose population exceeds by more than a reasonable amount the
population each should have on the basis of an equal distribution of elective offices.
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the problem of proof ventured would seem acceptable. Certainly only a
sound approximation, supported by the weight of probability, is all that
should be required in order to invoke the aid of the judiciary, since
plaintiffs must establish their case only by a preponderance of the
evidence. 144
CONCLUSION
The foregoing exercise has been an attempt to formulate a workable
plan to enforce section 2 of the fourteenth amendment by utilizing the
courts. It may reasonably be concluded that the various legal doctrines
involved, at least on a technical level, favor the success of such an en-
deavor. It is felt that the only substantial stumbling block in the path
of any such action, that of proof, can be adequately resolved. Real-
istically, however, as opposed to the exposition of pure legal theory,
such a plan would probably have little chance of success without a
favorable climate of public opinion to support it. It may be posited
that that climate has already been achieved, and that American public
opinion as a whole would welcome any decision by the judiciary further
vindicating the effectiveness of this, our most precious right, thereby
securing, by indirection to be sure, almost universal suffrage. By so
doing the courts would help to reinforce and preserve the democratic
framework within which we live, insuring to ourselves and our posterity
the continuing vitality of representative government as conceived in our
Constitution.
APPENDIX I
SUGGESTED STATUTE I-PLENMNTING SECTION 2 OF =H FOURTEENTH AMEND ENT
The following italicized amendments are recommended to 55 Stat. 761 (1941), 2 U.S.C.
§ 2a (1958). "( )" indicates proposed deletions:
(a) On the first day, or within one week thereafter, of the first regular session of the
Eighty-second Congress and of each fifth Congress thereafter, the (President) Director of
the Census shall submit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed, as well as the number of inhabitants of each
State, citizens of the United States and twenty-one years of age, whose right to vote has
been denied or abridged for reason other than crime or rebellion as contemplated under
section 2 of the fourteenth anendment, as ascertained under the seventeenth and each sub-
sequent decennial census of the population (and the number of). The Clerk of the House
of Representatives shall then calculate the number of Representatives to which each State
would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing number of Representatives
by the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to receive less than
one Member. He will also calculate in accordance with the figures tendered to Congress
by the Director of the Census the penalty, if any, to be imposed on each State, in accord-
ance with the mandate of section 2 of the fourteenth amendment.
(b) ( . . ) It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the House of Representatives within
fifteen calendar days after the receipt of (such) the statement of the Director of the Census,
to send to the executive of each State a certificate of the number of Representatives to
144 The census is, after all, only an approximation, though a good one, of the actual
population of each state on which apportionment is based. In the last analysis, therefore,
all that is needed is the quantum of proof requisite in any civil suit to convince the fact-
finder, i.e., the preponderance of the evidence must support the proposition sought to be
proven. McCormick, Evidence § 319 (1954).
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which such State (is) would be entitled under (this section) the first sentence of the second
section of the fourteenth amendment, and the number to which it is entitled, due account
being taken of the second sentence of the second section of the fourteenth amendment.
The following additional amendments are recommended:
(1) If at any time after such certification by the Clerk of the House of Representatives,
any State shall deny or abridge the right to vote of a sufficient number of citizens of the
United States, twenty-one years of age and inhabitants of that State, the Clerk of the
House shall, on receipt of proper evidence from any interested party, certify to the executive
of that State a reduction of that State's representation in the House of Representatives, as
prescribed by section 2 of the fourteenth amendment, to take effect no later than the
next election.
(2) On a demonstration by any interested party to the Clerk of the House of Repre-
sentatives, that the number whose franchise was denied or abridged has been reduced in any
penalized State by a sufficient amount to warrant an increase in that State's representation,
the Clerk shall certify to the executive of that penalized State the corresponding increase
in representation to which it is due. Such increase shall take effect no later than the next
election.
(3) Any person or State aggrieved due to the failure of any official under this act to
properly perform his duty may institute suit for injunction, or any proper remedy, to
redress his grievance, in the Federal District Court 'for the District of Columbia. An
appeal in any such action may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States
whether or not in absence of this act such appeal would lie.
Be it enacted that the Director of the Census is directed to ascertain in the most accurate
and reliable manner possible, in the next and all subsequent censuses, the number of legal
inhabitants of each State, citizens of the United States and twenty-one years of age, whose
franchise, for reasons other than participation in rebellion or conviction of crime, was
denied or abridged, as contemplated under section 2 of the fourteenth amendment. Such
figures shall be published together with the rest of the census results.
PENALIZATION UNDER THE PRESENT APPORTIONMENT IF SECTION 2 WERE ENFoRcED
6c
5 Penalty
Penalty based
with 10% on %
leeway the state
1 2a 3b 4 over exceeds
Number Number Number % of national the
of of of citizens 21 average national
,Represen- citizens 1 votes and not of average
tatives and in the cast voting those of those
presently state 1950 in in not not
State apportioned census 1952 1952 voting voting
U.S.A 435 94,800,000 61,552,000 35 -16 -26
Alabama 9 1,755,000 426,000 76 - 3 - 4
Arkansas 6 1,110,000 405,000 64 - 1 - 2
Georgia 10 2,040,000 656,000 68 - 2 - 3
Kentucky 8 1,738,000 993,000 43 0 - 1
Louisiana 8 1,577,000 652,000 59 - 1 - 2
Mississippi 6 1,205,000 286,000 76 - 2 - 2
North Carolina 12 2,305,000 1,211,000 47 0 - 1
South Carolina 6 1,148,000 341,000 70 - 2 - 2
Tennessee 9 1,973,000 893,000 55 - 1 - 2
Texas 22 4,587,000 2,076,000 55 - 2 - 4
Virginia 10 2,013,000 620,000 69 - 2 - 3
aSource for 2, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 33 (1959).
bSource for 3, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 347 (1959).
CSee note 140 supra. All figures are to the nearest thousand, whole number or % (i.e., .5
or more-next whole number).
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